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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
JASON THOMAS GENOVESI, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 920803-CA 
STATE'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTION 
This petition is filed pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. It is filed for one narrow purpose: 
clarification of certain language contained in this Court's 
opinion, State v. Genovesi, No. 920803-CA, issued February 11, 
1994 (copy appended to this petition). In filing this petition, 
the State, as petitioner, reserves its right to raise other 
objections to that opinion, should it choose to do so, in a 
petition for certiorari review by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this rehearing petition, this Court's 
opinion adequately describes this case: Defendant appeals his 
conviction for manslaughter, entered following a jury trial. He 
argues, in the main, that certain evidence seized from his home, 
pursuant to his wife's consent, was improperly admitted at that 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT'S OPINION SHOULD BE AMENDED, TO 
CORRECT LANGUAGE SUGGESTING THAT DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION HAS BEEN SET ASIDE. 
This rehearing petition might be more appropriately 
styled as a "Motion for More Definite Statement," cf. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 12(e), directed not to defendant, but to this Court. The 
language in this Court's opinion on this appeal is susceptible to 
ambiguous interpretation, and the State, accordingly, desires 
clarification. 
The ambiguity arises from the opinion's opening 
paragraph, which recites that defendant appeals his manslaughter 
conviction. The Court then states, in the same paragraph, "We 
vacate and remand." Genovesi, No. 920803-CA, slip op. at 1 
(emphasis added). 
The emphasized term, "vacate," following reference to 
defendant's appeal from his conviction, suggests that this Court 
has set aside the conviction. As such, "vacate," in the opening 
paragraph, suggests that defendant might be entitled to some form 
of release from incarceration (State's records reflect that he is 
serving a term at the Utah State Prison)--on bail or otherwise, 
pursuant to this Court's opinion. This suggestion, the State 
hopes, is not intended. 
The bulk of the opinion contains this Court's 
explanation about why the written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, filed by the trial court following 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, are not "sufficiently 
2 
detailed to allow this court to meaningfully review the trial 
court's decision [denying the motion]." Slip op. at 4. The 
CONCLUSION paragraph then reiterates that lf[t]he trial court's 
findings of fact and order denying Jason Genovesi's motion to 
suppress are insufficient to allow adequate appellate review. 
Accordingly, we vacate that ruling and remand this matter to the 
trial court . . . " (emphasis added). 
The opinion's conclusion therefore indicates that it is 
not defendant's conviction that is vacated; rather, only the 
denial of the motion to suppress is vacated, pending entry of new 
findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court. If 
that is this Court's intention, it should so clarify. 
The State sees two ways to achieve such clarification. 
First, the Court can modify the use of "vacate" in the opening 
paragraph, to clarify that only the pretrial ruling on 
defendant's motion to suppress is vacated, while the conviction 
remains in force. Second, the Court could delete the term 
"vacate" entirely from the opinion, and state that it is only 
remanding this case temporarily for entry of the requested 
findings and conclusions, upon which "adequate appellate review" 
of the order denying the motion to suppress can then be 
undertaken. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's manslaughter conviction, entered upon a 
jury verdict, should be presumed valid and fully enforceable, 
until and unless defendant, upon "adequate appellate review," 
3 
persuades this Court to reverse that conviction. Rehearing 
should be granted, and this Court's February 11, 1994 opinion 
amended, to reflect this. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *S day of February, 1994 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing State's Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to BRADLEY P. RICH, of YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ, attorneys 
for defendant-appellant, 175 East 400 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this I ^ > day of February, 1994. 
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APPENDIX 
This opinion is subject to revision before rro i i 1004 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. r t o 1 1 wan 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS fCm^fiPc^ay^^^ 
W* Mary T. Noonan 
— _ O O 0 o o ~ — ' C»trk of tht Court 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jason Thomas Genovesi, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case NO. 920803-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 11, 1994) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Bradley P. Rich, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham, David 8. Thompson and J. Kevin Murphy, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.1 
RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Jason Thomas Genovesi appeals his conviction of 
manslaughter, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990). We vacate and remand. 
FACTS 
On the afternoon of March 20, 1992, paramedics responded to 
an emergency "911" call from a residence in Kearns, Utah, where 
Jason Genovesi, his wife Lisa, and her two minor children from a 
former marriage, Justin and Gavin Adams, lived. Jason Genovesi, 
who had been at home taking care of the children while his wife 
was at work, had made the call to report an injury to Gavin 
Adams, age two. When the paramedics arrived, they found Jason 
Genovesi kneeling over Gavin Adams, who appeared to have a broken 
neck. Resuscitation efforts were undertaken, but failed, and 
1. Judge Russon authored this opinion prior to his appointment 
to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Gavin Adams was pronounced dead shortly after his arrival at a 
nearby hospital. 
Soon after the paramedics had left the Genovesi residence to 
take the child to the hospital, Deputy Kenneth R. Patrick of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office arrived at the home. Following 
a cursory search, Deputy Patrick took some photographs of the 
home's interior and asked Jason Genovesi to accompany him to a 
local police station for questioning. After interviewing Jason 
Genovesi, Deputy Patrick arrested him for child abuse. 
The next day, March 21, Deputy Patrick contacted Lisa 
Genovesi and requested permission to go into the Genovesi home in 
order to "take measurements and search for evidence. •• According 
to Deputy Patrick's testimony, he repeated this request three 
times, and each time she agreed. During this search, the 
officers took additional photographs, particularly of a bunk bed 
from which, according to Jason Genovesi, Gavin Adams had fallen, 
causing his fatal injuries. Additionally, the officers cut out 
and removed a section of a plasterboard wall with a head-shaped 
dent in it, a hair that was affixed to the dent in the wall, and 
a section of carpet. At no point did the officers procure a 
search warrant for the home. 
Three days later, Jason Genovesi was charged by information 
with manslaughter, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990). He then filed a motion to suppress 
all evidence obtained as a result of the above searches of his 
home on the ground that those searches violated his rights under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Following a hearing at which Deputy Patrick testified to the 
above events, Genovesi/s motion was denied. Genovesi was 
subsequently tried by a jury and convicted of manslaughter. 
Genovesi appeals, arguing that: (1) the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law supporting the trial court's order denying 
his motion to suppress are insufficient to permit adequate 
appellate review and, therefore, require remand; (2) Lisa 
Genovesi's consent to search the home was invalid under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution; and (3) there were no 
exigent circumstances justifying warrantless entry of the 
Genovesi home.2 The State responds that: (1) the trial court's 
2. Genovesi also argues on appeal that he was denied his right 
to a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community 
because the trial court accidently eliminated from the venire 
(continued...) 
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order denying Jason Genovesi's motion to suppress is sufficient 
to allow this court to adequately review the trial court's 
determination that the evidence in question did not require 
suppression; (2) both searches were valid under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution; and (3) even if the trial 
court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained in the 
searches, such error was harmless. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Jason Genovesi challenges the sufficiency of the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law underlying the trial court's order 
denying his motion to suppress. M[W]hen assessing a trial 
court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we %will not disturb the 
factual findings underlying .the ruling unless they are clearly 
erroneous.'" State v. James. 858 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Utah App. 
1993) (quoting State v. Mincv. 838 P.2d 648, 652 (Utah App. 
1992), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992)). "Findings are 
clearly erroneous only when they are against the clear weight of 
the evidence or when the appellate court is convinced that a 
mistake has been made." State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 770 
(Utah App. 1990). 
Although we generally grant substantial deference to the 
trial court's findings of fact, we do so only when the findings 
11
 * disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached.'" State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 
882 n.l (Utah App.) (quoting RupK?r v. ppltpn, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1979)), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
Moreover, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) requires the 
trial court to specify its findings on the record when resolution 
2. (...continued) 
persons with surnames beginning with the letters WAM through lfR." 
Specifically, he argues that persons with surnames beginning with 
the letters at the end of the alphabet are more likely to suffer 
from a condition known as "alphabetic neurosis,11 a term which he 
fails to define in his brief. Since this issue is, on its face, 
without merit, we do not address it. See State v. Carter. 776 
P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (appellate court need not address 
every argument, issue or claim raised on appeal); see also state 
v. Jones. 783 P.2d 560, 565 (Utah App. 1989) (appellate court 
will not engage in "unnecessary verbiage19 to address meritless 
arguments), aff'd. 808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1991); accord State v, 
Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1228 (Utah App.)# cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 
(Utah 1993). 
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of factual issues is necessary to the disposition of a motion.3 
James. 858 P.2d at 1014-15; Marshall. 791 P.2d at 882. Since the 
issues presented in search and seizure cases are highly fact 
sensitive, see, e.g.. Lovearen. 798 P.2d at 770; Marshall, 791 
P.2d at 881, the findings of fact must be sufficiently detailed 
to allow this court to meaningfully review the trial court's 
decision. £affi££# 858 P.2d at 1015; Lovearen. 798 P.2d at 770. 
Likewise, the trial court's conclusions of law must also be 
sufficient to allow for adequate appellate review. State v. 
Pharris. 846 P.2d 454, 465 (Utah App.) (requiring trial courts to 
record sufficient conclusions of law on all evidence relevant to 
its decision in order to facilitate appellate review), cert. 
denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Arrovo. 796 
P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (holding that case must be reversed and 
remanded when trial court's findings and conclusions are 
insufficient to support trial court's findings or court of 
appeals's conclusions as to consent); Marshall. 791 P.2d at 889-
90 (reversing and remanding for a further hearing on the issue of 
consent); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 981 (Utah App. 1988) 
(reversing and remanding "for the trial court to make sufficient 
findings of fact and conclusions on the issue of consent"). 
Turning to the case at bar, we note that the trial court 
made no oral findings of fact, and its written ruling on Jason 
Genovesi's motion to suppress consists merely of the following 
findings of fact and order: 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence 
acquired by a search of defendant's residence 
came on regularly for hearing the 19th day of 
August 1992. The court heard the testimony 
of Kenneth Patrick, considered the arguments 
of counsel, and finds that: 
1. Officer Patrick believed, prior to 
beginning the search of defendant's 
residence, that he had obtained permission 
from defendant's wife to do so. 
3. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) provides, with our 
emphasis: "A motion made before trial shall be determined before 
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be 
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its 
findings on the record." 
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2. The lav in Utah allows one spouse to 
consent to the search of property owned or 
used jointly with the other spouse. 
3. Lisa Genovesi, the wife of 
defendant, did tell Kenneth Patrick, in a 21 
March 1992 telephone conversation, that he 
could go to defendant's and her residence to 
search for and collect evidence pertinent to 
the death of Gavin Adams. 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is 
therefore DENIED. 
The trial court's findings and order are insufficient in 
numerous respects, both with regard to the search that occurred 
on March 20, during which photographs were taken, and the March 
21 search, during which more photographs were taken and physical 
evidence was removed from the Genovesi home. 
As to the March 20 search, the trial court's findings of 
fact are inadequate inasmuch as the court failed to even address 
that search in its ruling, much less make detailed factual 
findings concerning the search. The trial court's ruling on 
Genovesi's motion to suppress is further deficient as to the 
March 20 search because it failed to make any conclusions of law 
whatsoever as to whether the warrantless search was justified 
because of exigent circumstances or some other exception to the 
warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling on Genovesi's motion to 
suppress requires remand for entry of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as to the March 20 search. 
As to the March 21 search, which the court did attempt to 
address in its findings and order, the trial court's ruling is 
also insufficient. The trial court's first finding, that Deputy 
Patrick believed he had permission to search, is irrelevant to 
the factual determination that Lisa Genovesi consented to the 
March 21 search.4 The trial court's second "finding of fact," 
4. This finding is likely also irrelevant to any conclusion 
regarding the voluntariness of Lisa Genovesi's consent. While it 
is true that whether consent is voluntary depends on the totality 
of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the one 
from whom consent is being sought and the details of the police 
conduct, Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 689, the State has not cited us to, 
and we have been unable to find, any cases holding that the 
police officer's mental state is a factor in this analysis. 
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that one's spouse may consent to the search of jointly ownec 
property, is actually a conclusion of law and does not belc-7 in 
the findings. Thus, the only proper finding of fact in the crial 
court's ruling is its third finding, which states that Lisa 
Genovesi gave Deputy Patrick permission Mto search for and 
collect evidence pertinent to the death of Gavin Adams.115 
However, even though the trial court properly found that 
Lisa Genovesi consented to the March 22 search, it failed to make 
any conclusions of law regarding the voluntariness of that 
consent. In cases involving the voluntariness of consent, both 
the Utah Supreme Court and this court have emphasized the need 
for sufficient conclusions of law. See, e.g.. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 
at 687; Marshall. 791 P.2d at 889-90; Sierra. 754 P.2d at 981. 
Thus, the lack of any conclusions of law whatsoever on the 
voluntariness of Lisa Genovesi's consent also requires remand. 
In State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court announced that the trial court's ultimate 
determination whether consent was voluntary or involuntary is a 
conclusion of law to be reviewed for correctness. Jg. at 1271. 
In determining whether the requisite voluntariness exists, the 
trial court must examine •• *the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of police conduct." Arrovo. 796 P.2d at 689 (quoting 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 
2047 (1973)); accord Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262-63. Moreover, 
"[t]he prosecution bears the burden of proving that the 
defendant's consent was voluntary.11 Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1263. 
Furthermore, the supreme court has enumerated certain 
factors to be considered in evaluating the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding consent, which include: (1) the 
absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 
(2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a 
mere request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner of the 
5. Jason Genovesi asserts on appeal that the trial court's third 
finding is unsupported by the evidence, insofar as Deputy Patrick 
asked for permission to take measurements and search for 
evidence, not to remove any evidence. However, since the scope 
of one's consent under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution is determined by what a reasonable person would 
understand the exchange between the officer and the one from whom 
consent is sought to mean, State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699, 705 
(Utah App. 1992), it would be absurd to hold that an officer who 
finds evidence as the result of an otherwise constitutional 
search cannot remove that evidence merely because he asked to 
£Sia££ll for it, not to take it* 
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[residence]; and (5) the absence of deception or trick on the 
part of the officer." State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 
(Utah 1980). 
Additionally, this court has recently stated: 
In order for consent to be voluntary, 
(1) there must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was unequivocal, 
specific, and freely and intelligently given; 
(2) the government must prove consent was 
given without duress or coercion, express or 
implied; and (3) the courts must indulge 
every reasonable presumption against the 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights 
and there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. 
State v, Harmon. 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah App. 1993). 
Accordingly, on remand, the court should consider the above 
factors and make proper findings of fact and conclusions of law 
as to the voluntariness of Lisa Genovesi's consent. 
As a final matter, we address Jason Genovesi's argument that 
the trial court failed to address his independent state 
constitutional analysis, which was properly raised and argued 
before that court, or to explain why it did not address that 
argument. At the hearing on his motion to suppress, Genovesi 
argued that not only was Lisa Genovesi's consent involuntary 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but 
it was also invalid under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. However, the trial court made no mention of this 
independent state constitutional analysis in its ruling on 
Genovesi's motion to suppress. Accordingly, since this matter 
must be remanded due to the insufficient findings of fact and 
conclusions of law underlying the trial court's order denying 
Genovesi's motion to suppress, the trial court is further 
instructed to address this matter on remand.6 
Because we conclude that the trial court's order denying 
Genovesi's motion to suppress was insufficient, we do not reach 
the other issues raised by the parties. 
6. The matter of the photographs also merits comment. A good 
deal of confusion has arisen concerning which photographs were 
taken during which search. The parties would be well advised to 
resolve this difficulty on remand in order to clarify this matter 
for the trial court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings of fact and order denying Jason 
Genovesi's motion to suppress are insufficient to allow adequate 
appellate review. Accordingly, we vacate that ruling and remand 
this matter to the trial court to: (1) make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law regarding the March 20 search; (2) make 
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the 
March 21 search; and (3) address Genovesi's independent state 
constitutional analysis, or give its reasons for not addressing 
the same. 
Leonard H. Russon, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
JTi- Slt/Lm&L 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. This case should not be remanded 
for findings and conclusions (as to the validity of the search of 
the home) unless we can definitively hold that the evidence 
obtained therefrom was prejudicial to the defendant. 
The State urges us to assume, for the sake of argument, 
"that both searches of Genovesi's home were improper, and that 
all evidence obtained during those searches should have been 
suppressed." The State contends that any error in denying the 
motion to suppress was harmless because other independent 
evidence overwhelmingly established defendant's guilt. Based on 
this argument, it would not matter what the trial court may find 
or conclude about the search of the home. see, e.g.. state v. 
Scandrett. 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970) (affirming 
conviction for second-degree murder where guilt was shown by 
untainted evidence so overwhelming that there was no likelihood 
of different result). 
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I dissent because the main opinion fails to address a 
potentially dispositive issue. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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